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THE UBICATION OF THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE 
Joseph M. Nyasani 
It is not only astronomers who have been wondering 
about what lies beyond the planetary system and the extent 
of that reality in terms of the space it occupies. Philosophers 
have equally been baffled by this same question even though 
it may not be fair to draw a sharp distinction between 
philosophy and astronomy in certain material respects of 
inquiry. For, many classical or even modern astronomers 
were as much astronomers as they were philosophers. Galileo 
Gal.ilei is a good example of that. Indeed the Greek Ionian 
School, in trying to unravel the mystery of the earth's 
constitution and, by implication, the essence of reality, 
was not merely philosophizing but also astronomizing. As 
a matter of fact it would seem to be an idle question to 
try to contrast philosophy with astronomy since the two 
are intimately connected and imply each other resting as 
they do on a common cognitive condition that compels the 
mind to unravel the enigma of the cosmic reality. 
Astronomers and philosophers alike have been puzzled 
by this unpleasant enigma down the years. They have for 
instance been wondering where this thing we call the universe 
is situated. Is it contained in one huge receptacle or is it 
an infinitely extended reality that defies the confines of 
space and thus bursts out of any physical delimitations? 
This is one of the most intractable questions in philosophy. 
It is also a perennial question in that so far no adequate 
or satisfactory answer has been found to demystify the secret 
of creation. This mystery notwithstanding, the human mind 
will never stop to inquire since the object of rationality, 
and indeed of active human reason, is precisely to pry into 
the unknown and to devote itself to the problem of questioning 
the question. The physical universe is one such question 
that the mind must grapple with. 
Cosmologists and Metaphysicians alike have always 
attempted to discern the nature of the physical universe, 
and to propose a rational explanation or theory that can 
facilitate a relative comprehension of the problem. However 
the problem is still as intractable as it is elusive. What 
they consider as an answer is still a wishful speeulation 
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designed to remove any form of diffidence about the dominion 
of human reason over nature. 
The question that we first of all want to address ourselves 
to is: where is the physical universe or, to be tautological, 
where is the 'ubication'l of the universe? This may look 
like an innocent question at face value, but it is very complex, 
uncanny and elusive more especially because it raises all 
kinds of assumptions with regard to our knowledge of the 
reality supposedly anteceding that 'ubication' or whereness 
itself. For to raise the question of 'where,' it is metaphysically 
imperative to know what 'where' is and where to locate 
it. If I am sitting in my office at the University of Nairobi, 
I am quite aware that my specific whereness has been clearly 
determined and demarcated by my relative position to the 
objects immediately surrounding me such as the four walls, 
the ceiling and the floor below my feet. These things happen 
to be a conditio sine qua non as far as my determinability 
as a being that is located goes. My whereness therefore 
seems to emerge out of a preceding reality of which I may 
not be aware, and which is itself determined by yet another 
antecedent reality which confers its relative whereness 
in a spatio-temporal context. This already raises or at least 
adumbrates the issue of infinite regress which, if rigorously 
pursued, should either nullify the very concept of whereness 
or at least expose its absurdity as a concept. As a matter 
of fact, on the basis of the stipulation of the doctrine of 
reductio ad absurdum, reinforced by the principles of economy 
on Occam's razor, it would make better sense to eliminate 
altogether any concept which calls for a futile exercise 
of infinite regress. Maybe that is one of the reasons why 
many philosophers have ignored the question of 'ubication', 
and preferred to focus their reflection on the nature of 
the physical universe only. 
The question we are introducing really demonstrates 
the elusive nature of the concept of 'ubication' in respect 
of the physical universe. As long as we maintain that 
'ubication' is determined only on the strength of several 
things standing contiguously to each other, it becomes 
impossible to locate the universe without suggesting that 
there may be more than one physical universe for purposes 
of definition. Hence the question of the possibility of 
multiplicity of universes is not altogeth3r an unfounded 
one. Small wonder then that eminent philosophers have 
been speculating that there might be alternative universes 
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in the immensity of creation. However none has really come 
up with an answer backed by logic because many answers 
seem to encroach upon the stipulation of the vital principles 
which govern scientific knowledge and indeed all cognitive 
claims, namely, the principle of contradiction, the p:rinciple 
of excluded middle and the principle of sufficient reason. 
As a matter of fact one eminent German philosopher, Leibniz, 
seems to have recognized this danger fairly early in his 
metaphysical speculations on the possibility of the multiplicity 
of universes. He argued that if there was anything like 
a possibility of many worlds conceptually existing, then 
it had to be equally possible that the author of them could 
have decreed that the best possible of them actually came 
into being. And in respect of the actual universe, he argued 
that the author would have had no sufficient reason to effect 
several universes of the same identical material composition.2 
And he probably could not juxtapose two or more distinct 
but identical universes in the same spatio-temporal context 
without breaching the principle of contradiction according 
to whi·ch a thing either is or is not. Thus if the universe 
is then it is impossible to regard it as existing and at the 
same time not existing. It must be one and the same thing 
identical with itself. And anything that is the universe but 
identical with the former cannot be in effect distinct from 
the other. It must be one and the same universe that we 
are really talking about. The same conclusion can also be 
inferred on the basis of the principle of identity; for nothing 
can both be identical to itself and to another under one 
and the same respect. Moreover, identity is an intrinsic 
immanent reality and not an extrinsic transient feature. 
Certain philosophical speculations on the possibility 
of a second universe have tended to produce 
counter-productive results, forcing some philosophers to 
adopt the theory of mono-cosmism. In their reasoning, they 
have argued that if two universes are juxtaposed as a reality 
and engulfed in the sea of ether, then it should be possible 
to arrive at the edge of one or the other since they would 
have to be two distinct realities actually specified. And 
that must be so purely on the basis of the logic of distinctness. 
Thus Achilles, the greatest runner, is able to sprint right 
to the edge of the universe and back to announce that he 
could go no further. But as it is, Achilles would probably 
never return. He will wander through the planets and stars 
in saecula saeculorum. Furthermore, if there were two 
universes with distinct edges, it would not be difficult to 
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env1s1on a situation where an archer or javeline thrower 
might wander to the edge and decide to hurl his javelin or 
rocket across the mass of ether filling the whole of the 
two separate universes. Were this to be possible then it 
should be possible for the javelin or the rocket to travel 
to the adjacent edge, hit there and either bounce back or 
ricochet towards a different direction, most likely towards 
the direction of the origin since there would be no other 
body anywhere to either obstruct or attract it to that 
direction. Moreover, disintegration of the object would 
be impossible since we assumed that the material composition 
of the second universe is identical to the first. 
This then is to say that the principles and characteristics 
of matter applying in this universe would also be applicable 
and valid in the second universe. One of those principles 
is that matter can never be destroyed even though it could 
change its form. Consequently then the matter or stuff 
that the javelin or rocket is made of would not be destroyed 
upon crashing on the edge of the second universe. It should 
be able, albeit in a different form, to boomerang back to 
the point of origin. But is this possibility realisable? Maybe 
the Super-powers could tell us the answer based on their 
inter-planetary and stellar missions. I do not know their 
capability to retrieve rockets that are on a mission to Mars 
or Jupiter. Most likely they are irretrievable and, ceteris 
paribm, they will keep on travelling in sempitemum. From 
the above we can infer that the universe is one and infinitely 
expansive. 
If the universe is one, expansive, and all-embracing, 
where is it to be placed then? Where exactly is its locm 
in the context of time and space? Is it a still or floating 
reality in a huge vacuum? What contains this thing that 
is either still or floating? In other words, is the universe 
in some kind of space? The answer is probably yes and no. 
If we are taking space to mean the highest extension of 
all the physical objects, there is room to say that such a 
space physically exists. But then this would not be the kind 
of space that is the object of metaphysical speculation. 
Similarly, if space is taken to indicate the tridimensional 
extension abstracted from physical objects and as such limited, 
it may be real indeed. This we could call mathematical 
space. However, the kind of space envisaged by Metaphysics 
must relate to something of an immense vacuum which would 
remain in the event of all bodies being destroyed and therefore 
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itself persisting as an indestructible reality. This kind of 
space moreover must be a reality that is infinitely 
inexhaustible, infinitely inconsumable; in other words, it 
must possess the unique quality of an illimitable receptive 
potentiality so as to be able to cope with the multiplication 
of physical objects in the event of any future additions that 
our mind can possibly grasp and which can be effected without 
exhausting the spatiality of the universe. Indeed such a 
space must possess an inexhaustible receptive potentiality 
since if it were an exhaustible reality, containing an 
inexhaustibly extended universe, it would be a contradiction 
of predication. It would almost be tantamount to asserting 
that from a non-being a being can emerg~ or that from a 
non-denomination a denomination can subsist. This is a 
curious antinomy that repugnates not only ordinary experience 
but also the logic of human reason. 
Moreover were the receptive vacuum to attain some 
point of saturation, then it must certainly burst out of itself 
and, in turn, postulate yet again an extrapositional vacuum 
that could rightly be denoted as vacuum vacui. And once 
it has burst out of itself there is no reason why it should 
stop bursting since under that respect it must be assumed 
to possess the qualities of a 'mobile'. Consequently as a 
mobile, it cannot stop or refrain from transiting because 
it would then cease to be a mobile. Hence the mobile, the 
vacuum vacui rendered, must of necessity transit on the 
principle that that w,hich is moved will be moved necessarily 
or, in our metaphysical jargon, whatever is essentially ton 
movetur must of necessity be rendered ton movebitur. This 
happens to be a metaphysical necessity which cannot be 
contradicted even by the greatest reason. 
The idea of vacuum vacui certainly evokes the unpleasant 
situation of what we referred to as reductio ad absurdum 
because of its inherent, inevitable and infinite regress 
implications. It would be entirely upon our minds either 
to pursue it as an inevitable reality at the expense of attaining 
no new knowledge or to abandon it altogether as a possibility 
at the expense of totally negating the idea of vacuum or 
space as a real existent. Many philosophers have tended 
to embrace the latter possibility. Philosophers of the 
rationalistic tradition, especially Descartes and Leibniz, 
have come very close to denying the reality of a vacuum. 
Descartes specifically asserts that an empty extension is 
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metaphysically repugnant since the essence of all physical 
objects consists in the very extension itself. According 
to him, space is nothing but an imaginary thing (being) of 
the mind with a good objective foundation in the actual 
physical phenomena.3 This position seems to have been 
inherited from the Scholastics who also held that space 
is not a real thing that can exist independently of the physical 
objects. Indeed that was generally the opinion of the majority 
of philosophers until Kant came along and contradicted 
it by insisting that spatiality in the sense of extension is 
a mere a priori subjective category by which, as it were 
our senses are inundated long before we experience anything. 4 
Kant is not alone in this position since the entire Empirical 
School of thought would probably have reduced the idea 
of space to some kind of subjective category that emanates 
from belief or custom deriving its force from many individual 
instances of association. 
Whatever the eminent philosophers of modern philosophy 
have to say about space, the general consensus among 
philosophers is that the space into which the mind would 
like to place the universe is really non-existent. It is merely 
imagined on the basis of everyday analogies fashioned by 
the human mind in the course of imbibing experience. This, 
in effect, is to say that the universe as the totality of physical 
objects available or can possibly avail to the human intellect, 
is not in space. It is itself either the basis for the concept 
of space or it is itself space confounded in the process of 
trying to draw a distinction that rightly ought to be made 
between the concept of the common locus and proper locus. 
It is a metaphysical fiction which derives a certain amount 
of objectivity from the analysis of human analogies. The 
universe is neither here nor there. It is neither anywhere 
nor somewhere. It is a paradoxicality whose reality is derived 
from its own manifest reality in the course of our mental 
gymnastics on what there is and what there is not. Space 
simpliciter. or space qua space does not exist. Consequently 
the universe cannot be in space which is itself non-existent. 
NOTES 
1. Ubication is derived from the Latin word 'ubi', meaning 
'where'. In its substantive form it means 'whereness' 
in terms of locus of a situated object. 
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2. See, for instance, Leibniz's 5th Letter to Clarke in 
Leibniz: Phµ.osophical Writings, translated by M. Morris 
& G.H.R. Parkinson and edited by G.H.R. Parkinson, 
London: Dent & Sons, 1973, pp. 223-224. 
3. See Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 1 
Cottingham, J. et al (trans), Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1985, p. 195. 
4. See Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith 
(trans.), London: MacMillan, 1964, pp. 67-74. 
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